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DECISIONS AND HOW THEY ARE MADE
In the wider sense, decision making is
embedded in the problem-solving process
and its many stages (Davidson and Stern-
berg, 2003; Güss et al., 2010). In the narrow
sense, decision making is understood as the
ability to select one of several alternatives
and to act accordingly (Güss, 2004). Previ-
ous research has often focused on decision
making in relatively predictable environ-
mentswith clear goals (e.g., expected utility
theory of von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, 1944). In recent decades the focus
has been on decision making heuristics,
i.e., strategies or rules of thumb, applied
in uncertain situations (e.g., Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974; Simon, 1979; Gigerenzer
and Gaissmaier, 2011).
Causality plays an important role in
many cognitive processes – and causal cog-
nition is itself inﬂuenced by culture (e.g.,
Norenzayan and Nisbett, 2000; Medin and
Atran, 2004; Beller et al., 2009; Bender
and Beller, 2011; for a controversial dis-
cussion of causal cognition, see Sperber
et al., 1995). Causality is especially impor-
tant during the decision-making process,
because the decision maker has to predict
what consequences speciﬁc decisions bring
about before making a decision.
Causality refers here to the predicted
decision options, that a speciﬁc planned
action, when executed under speciﬁc cir-
cumstances, will have a speciﬁc pre-
dicted effect. This deﬁnition of causal-
ity refers to Aristotle’s causa efﬁciens,
i.e., an action is the origin and will
cause an intended effect. Our under-
standing of causality is a constructivist
understanding, because causality refers to
the causal predictions of the actor and
sometimes the actor’s predicted probabil-
ity of causal consequences might differ
from a normative-mathematical probabil-
ity of causal consequences. Predictions by
actor and mathematical probability might
be quite high (“As it is raining slightly, I
will use the big umbrella and therefore not
get wet during my walk”), but predictions
by actor might be high and mathematical
probability might be quite low (“when I
buy a lottery ticket and use the birthdates
of my family as lucky numbers, then I will
win a million dollars”). Thus one could
speak of predicted causality guiding the
decision-making process. We are referring
here to the predictions of the actor across
domains.
The selection of decision alternatives
is dependent on several factors such as
importance, urgency, and likelihood of
success (e.g., Dörner, 2008; Dörner and
Güss, 2013). First, the predictions regard-
ing decision alternatives involve the esti-
mation of how important an alternative is.
The importance is related to the human
needs and the decision alternative, for
example, to drink a glass of water when
extremely thirsty would be more impor-
tant than the decision alternative to call
a friend to chat. Thus, although decision
making is a cognitive process, it is related
to our human needs and motivational
processes.
Second, predictions regarding decision
alternatives involve estimations of time and
resulting urgency. If I am in my ofﬁce and
it is 5:30 pm, and I want to buy some
groceries for the weekend and I know the
store closes at 6:00 pm, and I know it takes
me 15 min to get to the store, then the
decision alternative “check and respond to
emails” is perceived as less urgent (if the
time estimation to check and respond to
emails is longer than a few minutes which
is usually the case).
Third, predictions regarding decision
alternatives involve estimations of how
likely it is that the predicted consequences
actually happen. I know 15 min is the time
I need to go to the store and I know I
need an hour to check my emails and to
respond to them. This predicted likelihood
of success is dependent on one’s com-
petence: ﬁrst the epistemic competence,
i.e., the fact knowledge and experiential
knowledge of the past; and second, the
general competence, i.e., an estimation of
one’s ability to act successfully in the given
situation (Dörner, 2008). High general
competence is reﬂected in high predicted
likelihood of success for decision alterna-
tives (“I can do this”). In other words,
one believes in oneself and that translates
into one’s ability to deal with situations
successfully.
Judging importance, urgency, and like-
lihood of success for decision alternatives
can occur either automatically or delib-
erately, i.e., unconsciously or consciously.
Automatically means that based on previ-
ous experiences in similar situations, the
predictions and their results are known
and attributed to the current situation.
Often certain cues in the current situation
trigger the memory of similar situations
and connected with those the success-
ful actions in those situations which can
then be applied in the current situation
(e.g., recognition-primed decision making
according to Klein, 2008).
If the current situation is a novel sit-
uation, then deliberations about possible
www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 479 | 1
Güss and Robinson Diversity and universality in causal cognition
consequences of decision alternatives are
more likely to take place. The novel sit-
uation requires deliberate thinking and
predicting possible causal developments of
decision options.
CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON THE
PREDICTED CAUSALITY DURING
DECISION-MAKING
The brief discussion of decision making
and the variables inﬂuencing the selec-
tion of a decision alternative suggest ways
in which culture inﬂuences the decision-
making process and in which cultures
could differ. Culture can be understood as
implicit and explicit knowledge – including
knowledge about how to make decisions
and what decisions to make under what
circumstances – shared by a speciﬁc group
of people and transmitted from genera-
tion to generation (e.g., Smith et al., 2006).
According to action theory and sociocul-
tural theories, this knowledge is acquired
FIGURE 1 | Factors influencing predicted causality, decision making,
and the role of culture. The knowledge structure is shown as a simpliﬁed
neural network with interconnected neurons in blue color. From the node
representing the current situation two dashed arrows go to two predicted
situations (represented in brown dots). The ﬁrst one predicts two further
situations as probable linear consequences when certain actions take place
(represented by dotted arrows). The second one predicts two different
further developments when speciﬁc actions are taken. The selection of
one decision alternative then depends on importance, urgency, and
likelihood of success. Importance refers to the strength of a speciﬁc need.
Urgency refers to predicted time needed to execute a decision. Likelihood
of success refers to existing knowledge, i.e., epistemic competence, and
heuristic competence, i.e., the estimation of one’s abilities to deal
successfully with the current situation. Cultures differ regarding
importance, urgency, likelihood of success, and predicted causal
developments.
during social interactions (Vygotsky, 1978)
in a speciﬁc cultural, social, and historical
context (Cole, 1996) which offers simi-
lar opportunities for learning (e.g., Lave,
1991).
IMPORTANCE – MOTIVATIONS
Previously we have stated that the estima-
tion of decision alternatives’ importance
is related to needs. Although one can
assume the universality of some human
needs (Maslow, 1954), for example the
existential needs and the needs for sexu-
ality, afﬁliation, certainty, and competence
(Dörner, 2008) or the needs for autonomy,
competence, and relatedness as outlined in
self-determination theory (Ryan and Deci,
2000), it is very likely that the impor-
tance of these needs varies across cultures.
Church et al. (2013), for example, tested
self-determination theory in eight cultures
and found that Asian participants (Japan,
China, Malaysia, and the Philippines)
showed lower need satisfaction of compe-
tence and autonomy compared to Amer-
ican participants (United States, Mex-
ico, and Venezuela). Additionally, research
on individualism and collectivism has
shown that for members of collectivist cul-
tures, social and relational aspects of deci-
sions might be more important compared
to members from individualistic cultures
(e.g., Güss, 2004).
Thus, the cultural importance of certain
needs triggers different importance ratings
for decision alternatives related to these
needs.
URGENCY – TIME
Cultures encourage their members to
develop different expectations regarding
time and the future; not only the con-
tent of future developments, but also
their structure (Güss, 2013). Structural
differences can refer to the breadth and
width of future expectations. Does the
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development of decision alternatives and
their related causal predictions concern the
near future or the far future? Do decision
makers develop one decision alternative or
several?
Stable as opposed to unpredictable cul-
tural environments, are those cultural envi-
ronments in which social, political, eco-
nomic, and/or climate-geographic changes
are minimal and therefore allow their cit-
izens long-term planning and decision
making (Strohschneider and Güss, 1999).
In relatively unpredictable cultural envi-
ronments, it is not adaptive to develop
predictions that reach far into the future.
The predictions about possible likelihoods
of events would be too difﬁcult to make,
for example during times of inﬂation. Yet,
it is adaptive to develop several short-term
plans. In relatively stable cultures, it is
more adaptive to develop predictions and
to make decisions that reach far into the
future. Evidence for this argument can
be found in the following cross-cultural
studies on dynamic decision making and
planning.
German, U.S., Indian, Filipino, and
Brazilian participants were presented with
the dynamic, non-transparent task Cold-
store (Güss and Dörner, 2011). Partici-
pants attempted to regulate a broken ther-
mostat which was simulated on the com-
puter and to maintain an ideal temperature
during this task. The thermostat does not
react right away, but is time-delayed. When
it is turned up, it takes a little while for
the temperature to heat up; and when it
is turned down, it takes a while for the
temperature to cool down.
German and U.S. participants showed
adaptor-type decision making more often
than Indian, Filipino, and Brazilian par-
ticipants who showed more oscillator-
type decision making. Adaptor-type deci-
sion making means observing long-time
intervals of changes in the system and
adjusting slowly. Oscillator-type decision
making means reacting to the momen-
tary situation and regulating the tem-
perature from one extreme to the other
extreme without considering adequately
what happened before and without tak-
ing possible predicted developments into
consideration.
Regarding planning, researchers investi-
gated these differences using daily life sce-
narios in Brazil during a time of extremely
high inﬂation and in Germany during rela-
tively stable economic conditions. German
plans were longer and had more decision
alternatives compared to Brazilian plans.
Interestingly, Brazilian compared to Ger-
man participants were more optimistic
about the potential results of their deci-
sions (e.g., Güss, 2000). Thus decision
making was adapted to the conditions of
the cultural context.
LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS – EPISTEMIC
AND GENERAL COMPETENCE
Prediction of consequences and their like-
lihood of success are partly based on the
epistemic competence, i.e., world knowl-
edge in general and on speciﬁc domain
knowledge in particular which the deci-
sion maker has accumulated over time.
World knowledge is highly dependent on
culture such as what we learn when we
grow up.
Heuristics are a part of this epis-
temic knowledge which is acquired during
socialization. Such heuristics can differ
between cultures. Several experiments have
shown, for example, that Chinese par-
ticipants when confronted with uncertain
and contradicting materials preferred a
compromise. European Americans, how-
ever, tried to choose one correct position
(Peng and Nisbett, 1999). Thus the Chinese
learned and applied a “ﬁnd a middle way”
heuristic, whereas the EuropeanAmericans
learned and applied a “ﬁnd the right way”
heuristic.
Estimating the likelihood of success is
also based on general competence, i.e., the
estimation of one’s abilities to deal suc-
cessfully with the current situation. This
general competence also varies across cul-
tures (see also cross-cultural differences in
self-efﬁcacy, e.g., Scholz et al., 2002). Many
studies have shown, for example, that Chi-
nese students outperform U.S. students on
international math tests (e.g., Beaton et al.,
1996). One explanation for this ﬁnding
is that Chinese “students perceived con-
trollable causes, particularly effort, to play
a greater role in performance outcomes
than did their American peers” (Tuss et al.,
1995, p. 408). Also the Chinese moth-
ers viewed effort as the main cause for
low math performance, whereas Ameri-
can mothers attributed low performance
to other causes as well (Hess et al., 1987).
Thus, the actual math performance might
be related to a higher feeling of general
competence (because effort is controllable)
in the Chinese compared to the American
sample.
CONCLUSION
The main argument of this paper is
that decision making involves causal pre-
dictions about possible future develop-
ments and that decision making involves
estimation of importance, urgency, and
decision alternatives’ likelihood of suc-
cess (see Figure 1). We then presented
results from cross-cultural research show-
ing that these processes differ among cul-
tures and that culture highly inﬂuences
decision making. These cross-cultural dif-
ferences in decision making highlight the
embeddedness of decision making within
a speciﬁc eco-cultural historical context.
To put it in extreme but very realis-
tic terms, every decision is a cultural
decision.
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